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ABSTRACT
I cover three topics in empirical microeconomics. In the first chapter, titled In-
vestor Attention to Firm versus Market-wide Information Shocks: Evidence from
North Korean Missile Tests, I study whether attention towards salient political events
leads to underutilization of firm-specific information in the South Korean stock mar-
ket. I find that companies with earnings surprises in the top quartile experience a 1.6%
increase in the abnormal return on the announcement day, but a same-day missile
test takes away 70% of the positive response.
In the second chapter, titled Does Cultural Proximity Mitigate the Effect of Im-
migration on Electoral Outcomes? (with Gerard Domènech), we study the effect of
immigration on electoral outcomes using individual-level administrative data in Spain.
In a multiple instrumentations framework, we find that recent immigrants who arrived
within two years are associated with an increase in the vote share of the extremist
parties. Such an effect persists for additional two years but dissipates in the long-term.
When split by regions of origin, African immigrants have the greatest impact, followed
by Latin American immigrants. European immigrants do not affect the extremist vote
shares. An analysis of the unemployment rate and the number of children suggests
that immigrants tend to assimilate over time. The findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that cultural proximity mitigates the political reaction to immigrants.
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In the third chapter, titled The Effect of Daddy Quota on Gender Labor Mar-
ket Outcomes (with Petra Niedermeyerova), we study the impact of a father-specific
parental leave policy on labor market outcomes in Quebec, Canada. Using a province-
level difference-in-difference approach, we find that the so-called daddy quota in-
creases the probability of employment for women and decreases the wage of younger
men. The results suggest that the daddy quota promoted equal opportunities for
women in the labor market. In a theoretical framework, we show that policy-driven
changes in gender norms are consistent with our findings.
vi
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Investor Attention to Firm versus
Market-wide Information Shocks:
Evidence from North Korean Missile Tests
Cheonghum Park
Abstract
This paper studies whether investor attention towards market-wide information shocks
can lead to the underutilization of firm-specific information. I exploit the unpre-
dictability of the North Korean missile test outcomes and analyze whether investors
in South Korea fail to process earnings information when there is a missile test on
the same day of the earnings announcement. I first find that successful missile tests
reduce the average share price return by 2.3% within two trading days compared
to failed tests. I then find that companies with earnings surprises in the top quar-
tile experience a 0.8% increase in the abnormal return on the announcement day,
but a same-day missile test takes away 37.5% of the positive response. The results
show that salient market-wide information can crowd out another source of valuable
information about firms. I also find that successful missile tests affect the political
preferences in South Korea and increase the support for the left-wing party by 5%




An efficient financial sector promotes economic stability and growth. And the effi-
ciency of the stock market depends on investors’ ability to incorporate new informa-
tion into the valuation of their shares. But many factors, such as market-wide and
firm-specific factors, influence firm values, and investors have limited attention to ex-
amining all of them. To what extent do these various sources of information compete
and perhaps crowd out one another in the evaluation of firms and, in turn, harm the
efficiency of the market?
Geopolitical events provide a natural setting for studying how investors allocate
their limited attention across different sources of information. They have the saliency
that leaves investors in a cognitively constrained environment while also generating
relevant market-wide information on firm values that can compete with other sources
of information. However, the difficulty of analyzing the effect of geopolitical events
is that they are rarely exogenous to the stock market. Investors anticipate notable
events, and share price reflects such prior expectations.
This paper exploits a series of salient yet unpredictable geopolitical events: the
outcomes of long-range ballistic missile tests by North Korea. The missile tests by one
of the most unpredictable regimes have yielded nine successful and twelve failed tests
from 2006 to 2017. These test outcomes of a weapon of mass destruction determine the
degree of geopolitical risk in the area. As the closest neighbor, South Koreans express
concerns about national security and economic stability after successful missile tests.
Using the unpredictability of test outcomes and their market-wide implications, I
study how investors with limited attention process multiple sources of information
when facing salient events.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I establish the relevance of North Korean
missile tests in South Korea. I begin by analyzing the saliency of missile tests from
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internet search activities and changes in political preferences. I then compare the
average share price return on the Korea Exchange (KRX) around the days of failed
and successful missile tests in an event study framework. Second, I study whether
the market-wide information shocks shift investors’ focus away from processing firm-
specific information. Specifically, I examine the under-response to earnings shocks
from six long-range missile test incidents where at least one firm released an earnings
announcement on the first trading day after the missile launch.
I first find that North Korean long-range missiles increase the average Google
search volume of the keyword North Korea by 0.5 SD and that the missile tests also
affect the political preferences and increase the left-wing party support rate by 5%.
In the analysis of stock prices, I find that average share price return decreases by
1.2% on the first trading day after a successful missile test compared to failed tests.
The difference expands to 2.3% over the two following trading days and persists
throughout the study’s time window.
Then, I find that the market-wide information shock of missile test outcomes
generates under-response to earnings surprises. The results show that the abnormal
return increases by 0.8% on the day of positive earnings announcements, but a same-
day missile test takes away 37.5% of this response. The results are consistent with
the hypothesis that investors focus more on processing missile test outcomes and less
on firm-specific earnings information because of their limited attention. Alternatively,
successful missile tests could have discounted the relevance of earnings information
on firm values due to concerns about conflicts. However, I find that both successful
and failed missile tests generate under-response to positive earnings surprises.
Finally, I discuss the mechanism underlying the main findings by examining two
relevant cases. First, I look at the impact of short-range missile tests on the share
prices in South Korea. Because North Korea has successfully developed short-range
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missiles already since the early 1990s, launching the familiar kind would not raise
security concerns as the long-range missiles do. In a similar event study framework,
I show that short-range missiles do not impact the share prices on KRX. Second, I
analyze the Japanese stock returns after long-range missile tests. While an accidental
escalation can lead to a devastating conflict within the country for South Koreans, the
concerns regarding North Korean missiles are less direct for the Japanese. I find that,
even though long-range missiles draw the attention of the Japanese public, they do
not impact the average returns on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TYO). These findings
are consistent with the underlying mechanism that severe concerns about the national
security and economic stability of the market affect investor behaviors.
This paper is most closely related to the studies of the implications of limited
attention in the stock market. Researchers have established that investors pay less
attention to information about firm values when distracted by extraneous events.
For example, Della Vigna and Pollet (2009) shows that investors under-respond to
earnings surprises announced on Friday compared to other weekdays. Hirshleifer et al.
(2009) documents similar under-response to earnings surprises when a higher number
of firms release their earnings announcements on the same day. Huang et al. (2019)
finds increased return comovement as well as under-response to earnings surprises on
days of unusually large jackpot lotteries in Taiwan.
The studies in the literature commonly use extraneous events that distract in-
vestors from trading their shares. They find that investors under-respond to informa-
tion when they are not focused on the firms with updated information. This paper
exploits a setting where the events not only draw the investors’ attention but also
generate essential information for the valuation of companies.1 The setting allows me
to study whether different sources of information can crowd each other out. This set-
1Chen et al. (2018) and Liu et al. (2020) discuss a similar setting where they compare investors’
response to macroeconomic news and individual firms’ earnings announcements. The main difference
in their setting is that macroeconomic news pressures are not necessarily extraneous.
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ting coincides closely with the existing theoretical frameworks and, thus, contribute
to validating the theories and their implications.2
Second, this paper relates to the studies on the stock market impacts of geopolit-
ical events. A large body of works studied the relationship between geopolitics and
share price returns, but only a few papers established a causal relationship, probably
because of the difficulty in dealing with the endogeneity. Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) studied terrorism in the Basque Country and used the gain and loss of credi-
bility of a publicly announced cease-fire to study the effects of conflict on share prices.
They find that companies closely related to the Basque Country benefitted from the
cease-fire. In the context of civil war in Angola, Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) ex-
ploits the sudden end of the war after the death of the rebel leader and finds that the
return declined for diamond companies in Angola. More closely related to this paper’s
setting of interstate conflict is the work by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009). They proxy
the probability of war in Iraq with the price of an asset tied to the ouster of Saddam
Hussein by a specific date and find that a higher possibility leads to a decline in S&P
500.3
This paper expands this literature in two ways. First, I document that geopolitical
events not only affect stock returns but also generate shocks to investor attention and
induce under-response to earnings surprises. To my knowledge, this paper is the first
to study the intersection of economic impacts of geopolitics and limited investor atten-
tion. This paper shows how national security concerns can harm economic activities
by drawing public attention. Second, I contribute methodologically by showing that
2For example, see Peng and Xiong (2006); Veldkamp (2006).
3Other research studying the relationship between geopolitical events and share price returns
include Eldor and Melnick (2004); Arin et al. (2008); Chesney et al. (2011); Karolyi (2006); Anton-
akakis et al. (2017). See Frey et al. (2007) for a survey of the literature on the economic outcomes of
terrorism. Kim and Roland (2014) specifically analyzes geopolitical events closely related to North
Korea and finds that the collection of events do not have a significant effect on the South Korean
stock returns.
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unpredictable test outcomes from the development of a weapon of mass destruction
provide a natural setting for geopolitical case studies.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides background
on understanding the geopolitics of North Korean missile tests and describes the
data used in the analysis. In Section 1.3, I present the econometric results and their
interpretations. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the findings and discussing the
implications in Section 1.4.
1.2 Background and Data
In this section, I provide context on how North Korean missile tests raise the geopo-
litical tension in the area and thus affect the people in South Korea. The data section
explains the data sources and variables used in the analysis.
1.2.1 The Geopolitics of North Korea’s Missile Program
On July 5th, 2006, North Korea launched Unha, a satellite launch vehicle (SLV) that
marked the country’s first test of a rocket with the flight capability of an interconti-
nental ballistic missile (ICBM). Although the first attempt turned out to be a failure
to the relief of the rest of the world, Kim Jong-il nevertheless gained the world’s
attention. After three months, in October 2006, the regime also conducted its first
nuclear test, and, since then, the series of missile tests updated the world’s belief on
North Korea’s ability to strike as far as the east coast of the United States with their
nuclear weapons.
Since Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea, led the first ballistic missile test
in 1984, the Kim family regime has developed various missiles over three generations.
These include short-range (SRBM, 300 km - 1,000 km), medium-range (MRBM, 1,000
km - 3,500 km), intermediate-range (IRBM, 3,500 km - 5,500 km), and submarine-
launched (SLBM, 900 km - 2,000 km due to North Korea’s limited submarine range)
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ballistic missiles as well as ICBM (more than 5,500 km) and SLV. The SRBM and
MRBM that reach most of the East Asian countries have been fully operational since
the 1990s, while the SLV and SLBM are more recent developments in the 2010s and
the IRBM and ICBM require further advancements in the technology.4
The flight capabilities of IRBM, ICBM, and SLV pose a significantly higher threat
to the world than the rest of the missiles. It was after the development of these long-
range missiles that North Korean test launches started to impact the geopolitics of
the area. For example, in 2017, North Korea responded to an aggressive tweet by
Donald Trump by threatening to strike the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam with their
IRBM. The threat initiated discussions on its validity, and the U.S. Secretary of State
Rex Tillerson, stopping by the island, told the media that there is no imminent threat
and that “Americans should sleep well at night” (Baker and Choe, 2017).
However, it is the Korean people who fear the most when the tension rises around
the peninsula. The Korean War occurred only two generations ago, and the two Koreas
are still technically at war because no peace treaty was ever signed. Masses of rockets
and artillery are still targeting the capital city of Seoul, which is only 60 kilometers
away from the North Korean border. If Kim Jong-un decides to utilize the long-
range missiles and strike the U.S. territory, it would still be in the Korean Peninsula
where most of the aftermath of the following events will take place. Therefore, the
development of destructive weapons by their closest neighbor and the increased risk of
accidental escalations raise severe concerns on national security among South Koreans.
As a result of the ongoing tension between the two Koreas, the politics in South
Korea have also centered around matters with North Korea. The two main parties
are characterized by contrasting policies concerning North Korea. The left-wing party
supports the nonviolent approaches that privilege diplomatic talks with the North
4See Missile Defense Project (2018) for a complete list of North Korea’s ballistic missiles and
their development history.
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and limiting military activities. For example, the president of the left-wing party,
Kim Dae-jung, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 with his “sunshine policy” that
led to the first summit between the two Koreas. On the contrary, when they were
in power between 2008 and 2016, the right-wing party reinforced global sanctions
and military alliances with Japan and the United States with the eventual goal of
overthrowing the regime. The Kim family regime has not been hesitant in publicly
expressing their opposition to the “violent” policies because it feels threatened by the
US-Korea military exercises and needs to send messages that will deter them from
attacking and threatening the regime. Such messages include, for instance, frequent
short-range missile launches around the days of joint military training by the U.S.
and South Korea.
The development of long-range missiles by North Korea increased the geopolitical
tension in East Asia by involving the United States and thereby increasing the possi-
bility of accidental escalations. Successful missile tests generated particularly severe
concerns in South Korea on its national security and economic stability because an
eventual conflict can lead to devastating outcomes in the peninsula. Therefore, South
Korean politics also evolved around North Korean issues, making contrasting views
on North Korea policies the identities of the parties.
1.2.2 Data
I use the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) North Korean
Missile Test Database for the missile test data. The database includes all missiles
launched by North Korea capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms a distance of
at least 300 kilometers. To study the impact of long-range missiles, I restrict to SLV,
IRBM, and ICBM tests that have exact launch time information and a confirmed
status. If the launch was after trading hours, I consider the test to have occurred on
the next trading day.
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In Table 1.2, I list the resulting 21 missile test days and provide information
including missile type, launch date and time, and test outcome. North Korea first
developed SLV between 2006 and 2016, followed by IRBM in 2016 and 2017, and
ICBM in 2017. There have been 5 SLV, 13 IRBM, and 3 ICBM tests showing 2, 4,
and 3 successful outcomes, respectively. The last three columns of the table indicate
the missile tests used in each of the three main analyses. I describe the details of this
selection process throughout the rest of the data section.
1.2.2.1 Internet Search Volume and Party Support Rate
For the internet search data, I retrieve the daily Google search volume of the keyword
”북한 (North Korea)” within South Korea using pytrends, a Python API for Google
Trends. The website provides normalized daily search volume data for a keyword,
scaled on a range of 0 to 100, with 100 being the day of the highest regional search
volume within the period of interest. Although Google Trends provides data from as
early as 2004, the daily data is only retrievable for a query period shorter than nine
months. Therefore, following the codes by Tseng (2019), I request results for multiple
nine-month periods that overlap for 100 days with each other and use the search
volume in the overlapping period to rescale the index for consistency over time. The
resulting data includes normalized search volume from 2004 to 2020, and I further
standardize the results to have zero mean for ease of interpretation.
For the party support rate data, I retrieve the weekly poll reports between 2012
and 2019 from Gallup Korea’s website (http://www.gallup.co.kr). The reports include
cross-tabulations that display the support rate for each political party in South Korea
by various demographics, including political orientation. I expand the data to have
individual-level observations, using the sample size of each demographic.
The dependent variables for the analysis are Lefti,t and Righti,t that indicate
whether individual i responded to support each of the main parties at poll t. I compare
10
the support rates before and after failed and successful missile tests. Successm(t) indi-
cates whether the reference missile test m(t) had a successful outcome. MissileTestt
is the test indicator that is equal to 1 if poll t was taken within one week after the
reference missile test m(t) and 0 if the poll was taken within one week before m(t).
1.2.2.2 Average Share Price Return
The daily stock prices on the Korea Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange come from
the Compustat Global dataset. The outcome variable for the analysis of average return
is the cumulative return, CRc,t =
∑t
s=m(t)−8Rc,s, where Rc,t is the share price return
for company c on trading day t.
To implement the event study analysis, I construct the event time indicator vari-
able D`t by specifying the closest missile test day m(t) for each trading day t as the
reference test day. I set D`t = 1 if t − m(t) = `, where ` is in the nine-day event
window, L = {−4,−3,−2, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Note that ` = −1 is the reference day for the
event study and omitted. If the launch was on a trading day, ` = 0 indicates the day
of the launch and, otherwise, it indicates the first trading day after the test.
Specifying the reference test day for each trading day is not a trivial task because
there are occasions where multiple missile tests occur in a short window of time.
In such a case, I put more weight on post-test observations because the focus of the
event study is to analyze the change after missile tests. Specifically, I consider the data
points less than or equal to five trading days after a test to be post-test period but
not pre-test period even when there was a closer missile test after the data point. For
example, North Korea tested the IRBM Musudan on the 15th and 20th of October
in 2016. Following the rule, I consider all trading days between the 15th and the 20th
as post-test but not pre-test period.
To create a balanced panel for the event study, I further restrict to missile tests
with sufficient pre-test and post-test trading days. For example, for the main speci-
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fication, I use a nine-day event window and keep 14 out of 21 missile tests with at
least four days of event time before and after. The nine-day event window reflects a
time window that retains as many missile tests as possible while keeping a reasonable
amount of trading days before and after the tests to serve the purpose of the event
study. I also check the robustness of the results to the choice of the event window
and the missing tests from creating the balanced panel. Then I drop an observation
with a strong existing trend in the market return. The market trends for each missile
test are in Figure A.1. The complete list of missile tests utilized in the analysis is in
Table 1.2.
The test result variable Successm(t) indicates that the launch was successful in the
reference missile test day m(t). I follow the CNS database definition of failure as a
catastrophic failure during the flight test, such as an explosion, and success otherwise.
On June 22nd, 2016, two long-range missile tests took place within about two hours
from each other and yielded different test outcomes. I consider this day as a single
missile test observation with a successful test outcome because it marked the first
successful launch of an IRBM by North Korea, which outweighs the fifth consecutive
failure that happened two hours before.
1.2.2.3 Earnings Surprise
The outcome variable for studying the response to earnings surprises is the abnormal
return ARc,t of company c on trading day t. I estimate β̂ for each reference missile
test-company pair. Following Della Vigna and Pollet (2009) and the vast literature in
finance, I use the market model Rc,t = αc,m(t) + βc,tRm,t−u, where Rc,t is the return,
Rm,t−u is the market return on day t− u with 20 ≤ u ≤ 300.
The quarterly earnings data for the companies listed in KRX come from the
Compustat Global dataset. However, the announcement dates in the dataset are of-
ten incorrect. Instead, I scrape the announcement dates of the quarterly financial
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reports from the website of DART, the South Korean governmental financial infor-
mation disclosure system (http://dart.fss.or.kr). Because South Korean companies
are required to release their quarterly financial statements through DART, the an-
nouncement dates on the website are the dates when investors first see the quarterly
earnings. It is worth noting that there is very little room for adjusting the announce-
ment dates for individual companies because of the tight deadlines mandated by law.
It is unlikely that firms release their announcements depending on impending missile
tests while their financial departments and the external auditing firms work heavily
to meet the deadlines.






where ec,t is the earnings per share announced at trading day t for company c, êc,t is
the predicted earnings per share, and Pc,t−5 is the price of the shares of the company
5 trading days before the announcement.
To estimate the predicted earnings êc,t, I assume that the company’s earnings data
in the previous quarter and the change in the share price since the last announce-
ment contain meaningful information about investors’ expectations for the current
earnings. I regress each company’s quarterly earnings on their past earnings in four
prior quarters, the cumulative return since the last announcement, and the interac-
tion between past earnings and cumulative return. I also include asset data and their
interactions with the cumulative return in the explanatory variables to reflect the
asset-based valuation approach. The resulting earnings prediction measure is noisy,
but the results show that the earnings surprises calculated with these predictions
affect share prices in the expected direction.
Following Della Vigna and Pollet (2009) and Huang et al. (2019), I sort the earn-
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ings surprises into quantiles each year and compare the responses to the earnings
surprises in the top group to the bottom group. I set TopGroupc,t = 1 if company
c announced their earnings on trading day t and the earnings surprise was above
the 75th percentile, and TopGroupc,t = 0 for no announcement days for company c.
Similarly, I set BottomGroupc,t = 1 for earnings surprise below the 25th percentile,
and BottomGroupc,t = 0 for no announcement days. I check the robustness of the
results to the grouping procedure and test eight quantiles instead of four as well as
linear response to quartiles. Note that I set the days without announcements as a
comparison group. I control the effect of missile test results on share prices within
this group.
For the time window of the analysis, I include the day of the missile tests and
four trading days before the tests, excluding the trading day just before the test. In
terms of the event time indicator described in the prior section, MissileTestt = 1
if D0t = 1 and MissileTestt = 0 if D
`
t = 1 for −4 ≤ ` ≤ −2. I take out the day
before missile tests from the comparison group because investors can anticipate the
imminent tests. They could already be paying more attention to information about
missile tests and less attention to earnings, in which case the day before the tests
would not make a good comparison group. Similar to the analysis of average returns,
I only keep the missile tests with observations in the entire event window to construct
a balanced panel. I further restrict the sample to use the missile tests where there
was at least one earnings announcement on the first trading day after the test. I set
the event window so that it includes as many earnings announcements as possible
while keeping a sufficient number of missile tests. However, because of the scarcity
of earnings announcements on the day of a long-range missile test, the sample only
includes six reference missile tests.
In Table 1.2, I provide the list of the missile tests utilized in the analysis. It includes
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two failed and one successful IRBM tests and one successful ICBM test. There were
no newspaper reports of these missile tests in South Korea before the launch. The
descriptives in Table 1.3 show that the sample is balanced over controls. There is no
statistically significant evidence that companies are more likely to release bad news
on missile test days.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Saliency of North Korean Missile Tests
I provide two brief analyses to show that North Korean missile tests are salient events
in South Korea.
First, I look at the internet search activity in South Korea after long-range missile
tests. In Figure 1.1, I present the average standardized daily Google Trends search
volume index of the keyword “북한 (North Korea)” in a fifteen-day window around
long-range missile tests. There is a clear jump of more than 0.5 standard deviations
in the average index on the days of missile tests, which persists for at least two more
days. The result shows that South Korean internet users pay attention to the North
Korean long-range missile tests.
Second, I analyze the change in the political preferences among South Koreans
after missile tests. The analysis employs a standard difference-in-differences strategy
of the following specification:
yi,t = λm(t) + β1MissileTestt + β2MissileTestt × Successm(t) + εi,t, (1.2)
where yi,t is either Lefti,t or Righti,t, λm(t) is the reference missile test fixed effect,
and εi,t is the error term clustered at the reference test level, m(t). Recall from section
1.2.2.1 that I include two polls to the sample for each missile test, one before the test
and one after, so that each cluster consists of observations from two weekly polls.
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The results in Table 1.1 show that the South Korean main left-wing party gains
4.8% of support after successful North Korean long-range missile tests compared to
after failed tests. The significant and sizable effect shows that the long-range missile
tests not only draw attention but also affect the political views of South Koreans.
The increased support to the left-wing party suggests that South Koreans prefer the
nonviolent approach better when there is a sign of successful missile development by
North Korea.
The result is sensible in the South Korean context where the right-wing party has
been in power from 2008 through 2016 and yet failed to inhibit the North Korean
weapon development. Successful missile tests could have suggested the inefficiency of
the right-wing policies to overthrow the regime. The result is also consistent with the
findings of Gould and Klor (2010) that terrorist attacks in Israel shifted the political
preferences to the left towards a more accommodating position. Table A.1 and Table
A.2 in the appendix show that the findings are robust to the ruling party status and
respondents’ political orientation, respectively.
1.3.2 Share Price Return
The event study analysis of the average cumulative return takes the following form:




`D`t × Successm(t)) + εc,t, (1.3)
where λc,m(t) is the fixed effect of each reference missile test-company pair and εc,t is
the error term clustered at the reference missile test and company level, using robust
two-way clustering(Colin Cameron et al., 2011).5
I present the event study results in Figure 1.2. For ease of interpretation, I plot
coefficients for failed (β`) and successful (β` + γ`) tests separately in (A) and the
5One-way clustering the errors only at the reference missile test level slightly reduces the standard
errors but not by a meaningful amount.
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difference between the two (γ`) in (B). The full regression output is in Table A.3 in
the appendix.
The results show that successful long-range missile tests decrease the average
cumulative share price return compared to failed tests. The difference in cumulative
return is significant at the 10% confidence level for all post-test trading days, excluding
the day after the missile tests, ` = 1. It takes two to three trading days for the market
to fully reflect the information generated by the missile tests and their outcomes. The
initial difference in returns of -1.2% at event time 0 expands for two trading days and
persists at between -2.3% and -2.5% for the rest of the event time.
The sizable impact of successful missile tests on stock prices indicate that in-
vestors in the South Korean stock market pay attention to the missile tests. And
more importantly, the reevaluation of stock prices depends strongly on the missile
test outcomes. Note also that there is no sign in the pre-test period that the market
predicts the test outcomes. Therefore, especially on the first few trading days after
the missile tests, investors will have to focus on evaluating their portfolio based on
the new information of test outcomes and observe the response of the market. The
newly generated focus on missile test outcomes will put the investors in a cognitively
constrained environment.
In Figure A.2 in the appendix, I present the result of the same event study analysis
in a 22-day event window using a non-balanced panel as a robustness check. The
number of long-range missile tests in the sample increases from 13 in the main analysis
to 19. The results exhibit a similar pattern for six to seven trading days after missile
tests. Successful tests generate a negative impact on share price returns of a similar
magnitude, and the effect seems to dissipate after seven trading days. However, the
results need to be interpreted with caution because more missile tests are missing in
the later period in the non-balanced panel.
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1.3.3 Under-response to Earnings Surprises
In this section, I study whether the attention to missile test outcomes limit the in-
vestors’ ability to process firm-level earnings surprises. The analysis takes the follow-
ing form:
ARc,t =λc,m(t) + β1TopGroupc,t + β2TopGroupc,t ×MissileTestt
+ β3BottomGroupc,t + β4BottomGroupc,t ×MissileTestt
+ γ1MissileTestt + γ2MissileTestt × Successm(t) + γ3Xc,t + εc,t, (1.4)
where λc,m(t) is the reference missile test-company pair fixed effect, Xc,t is the set of
controls, and εc,t is the error term clustered at the reference missile test and company
level, using the robust two-way clustering(Colin Cameron et al., 2011). Following
Huang et al. (2019), the control vector includes deciles for market capitalization and
the number of same-day announcements. Note that I also control for the test out-
comes. The coefficients of interest are β2 and β4, capturing the under-response to
positive and negative earnings surprises, respectively. I also investigate whether there
are heterogeneous effects depending on the test outcomes.
I present the results in Table 1.4. Column (1) presents the result for the preferred
specification. I find that earnings surprises in the top quantile increase the abnormal
return by 0.8% on the day of the announcement. However, a long-range missile test
on the same day takes away 0.3% or 37.5 percent of the positive response. In columns
(3) and (4), I sort the earnings in 8 quantiles. In columns (2) and (4), I examine the
heterogeneous effects of test outcomes. I find that both successful and failed tests
generate under-response to positive earnings surprises. I find neither response nor
under-response to negative earnings surprises, which is consistent with the findings
of Della Vigna and Pollet (2009). I could not identify the effect of failed missile tests
on the response to negative earnings surprises because of the small sample size of the
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bin.
In Figure A.4 in the appendix, I report the effects of linear quantiles on abnormal
returns. The results show a similar pattern. A unit increase in the earnings surprise
quantile increases the company’s abnormal return by 0.2%. A same-day long-range
missile test takes away 0.1% of the positive response.
1.3.4 Underlying Mechanism
As the final analysis of the article, I shed light on the underlying mechanism using two
related cases: the responses to short-range missiles in South Korea and the response
to long-range missiles in Japan.
For the analysis of the impact of short-range missile tests, I restrict to SRBM
tests that pose the least amount of additional threat. The sample includes 15 SRBM
missile tests from 2013 to 2020 with all of them having successful outcomes. In Figure
1.3 (A), I present the change in the average search volume index of the keyword North
Korea around SRBM missile tests. There are no significant changes around the tests,
suggesting that the short-range missiles do not draw significant attention from the
public.
Next, I investigate whether SRBM impacts cumulative share price returns using
the same event study specification in equation (1.3) but without the interaction with
test outcomes because all SRBM tests were successful in the sample. I present the
results in Figure 1.3 (B). Again, (successful) SRBM tests have no significant impact
on cumulative share price returns, although the point estimates suggest an increasing
trend since the day after the tests.
The results suggest that short-range missiles do not draw significant attention
from the public and do not affect the valuation of the companies on KRX. Recall
that North Korea has already successfully developed short-range missiles in the 1990s
and has enough artillery to destroy Seoul within a day. Therefore, another successful
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test launch of a short-range weapon does not generate new information about the
economy or national security.
The case of Japan provides a more interesting comparison to the main analysis
because North Korean long-range missiles do make an impression on the Japanese
public. In Figure 1.4, I present the average search volume index of the keyword ”北朝
鮮 (North Korea)” around the days of long-range missile tests and find that long-range
tests increase the search volume by five standard deviations in Japan. Note that the
size of the effect is not directly comparable to the South Korean result in Figure
1.1 because the index reflects the relative search volume of the keyword within each
region. The impact of missiles on search activity in Japan can be greater than in
South Korea simply because the keyword North Korea is not nearly as popular in
Japan in the rest of the days where there are no missile tests.
In Figure 1.5, I present the results of the event study analysis applying the same
regression specification as in equation (1.3) to the share prices on TYO. The results
show that long-range missiles do not significantly affect the share price return in
Japan.
To interpret these results, first, note that North Korea already has decent short-
range capabilities to reach Japan. Therefore, as in South Korea, the concerns around
long-range missiles in Japan are not on the increased risk of a missile strike. The
geopolitical tension comes from getting other countries like the United States involved,
which may lead to a higher chance of accidental escalation. And while Japan will
experience some consequences of an interstate conflict involving North Korea, the
threat to national security is not nearly as high as in South Korea where the potential
war will take place and produce devastating outcomes.
In short, both of the short-range missiles in South Korea and the long-range
missiles in Japan do not generate severe concerns on national security as the long-
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range missiles do in South Korea. Therefore, the findings that the North Korean
long-range missiles impact the South Korean stock market but not the Japanese
market and that short-range missiles do not draw attention are consistent with the
underlying mechanism of increased concerns on national security.
1.4 Conclusion
I investigated how salient geopolitical events can affect the efficiency of the finan-
cial market when investors have limited attention. I showed that North Korean mis-
sile tests generate market-wide information shocks in South Korea, which distracts
investors away from processing firm-specific earnings announcements. The findings
suggest that cognitively constrained investors do not pay enough attention to valu-
able information, even when they are actively trading their shares. Therefore, policies
aiming to reduce the cost of processing information in the times of binding attention
constraints can enhance the efficiency of the financial market. As individual investors,
as opposed to institutional investors, suffer more from the behavioral biases, studies
on the implications of limited attention on their financial stability can further guide
policy designs.
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Note: This figure documents the search volume of the keyword “North Korea” on the
South Korean internet around long-range missile tests. The x-axis plots the difference in
days relative to the day of the missile test. The y-axis plots the average standardized
Google Trends index. The horizontal line at zero represents the overall average of the
index between 2004 and 2019. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Note: This figure presents the event study analysis results of the effect of long-range
missiles on cumulative return in the South Korean stock market. In panel (A), dots
represent the response to successful tests, and triangles represent the response to failed
tests. In panel (B), dots represent the difference in the estimates between successful and
failed tests. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample is balanced over
event time and includes 14 long-range missile tests. For the numerical values underlying
this figure, see Table A.3.
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Note: The figure in panel (A) documents the search volume of the keyword “North
Korea” on the South Korean internet around short-range missile tests. The x-axis plots
the difference in days relative to the day of the missile test. The y-axis plots the average
standardized Google Trends index. The horizontal line at zero represents the overall
average of the index between 2004 and 2019. The figure in panel (B) presents the event
study analysis results of the effect of short-range missiles on cumulative return in the
South Korean stock market. Dots represent the difference in the estimates between
successful and failed tests. The sample is balanced over event time and includes 15
short-range missile tests. Vertical bars in both panels represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Note: This figure documents the search volume of the keyword “North Korea” on the
Japanese internet around long-range missile tests. The x-axis plots the difference in days
relative to the day of the missile test. The y-axis plots the average standardized Google
Trends index. The horizontal line at zero represents the overall average of the index
between 2004 and 2019. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Note: This figure presents the event study analysis results of the effect of long-range
missiles on cumulative return in the Japanese stock market. In panel (A), dots represent
the response to successful tests, and triangles represent the response to failed tests. In
panel (B), dots represent the difference in the estimates between successful and failed
tests. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample is balanced over event
time and includes 14 long-range missile tests.
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Missile Test -0.011 0.008
(0.009) (0.006)
Missile Test × 0.048** -0.016
Success (0.023) (0.012)
Observations 38344 38344
Dep. Var. Mean 0.359 0.225
Reference Test FE Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the difference-in-differences analysis results of the effect of
long-range missiles on the political preferences in South Korea. In column (1), the
dependent variable is the indicator for supporting the main left-wing party. In column (2),
the dependent variable is the indicator for supporting the main right-wing party. “Missile
Test” takes a value of 1 if the polling took place within one week after a missile test and 0
if the polling took place within one week before a missile test. “Success” indicates the
missile test outcome being successful. Standard errors are clustered at the reference missile
test level and reported in the parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.2: List of North Korean long-range missile tests
Date and Time Name Type Outcome Return Earnings
1 2006-07-05 05:00 Unha SLV Failure Y
2 2009-04-05 11:30 Unha SLV Failure
3 2012-04-13 07:38 Unha-3 SLV Failure Y
4 2012-12-12 09:52 Unha-3 SLV Success Y
5 2016-02-07 09:28 Unha-3 SLV Success Y
6 2016-04-15 05:33 Musudan IRBM Failure Y
7 2016-04-28 06:33 Musudan IRBM Failure
8† 2016-04-28 19:23 Musudan IRBM Failure
9 2016-05-31 05:28 Musudan IRBM Failure Y
10‡ 2016-06-22 08:01 Musudan IRBM Success Y
11 2016-10-15 03:31 Musudan IRBM Failure Y
12 2016-10-20 06:59 Musudan IRBM Failure
13 2017-04-05 06:42 Hwasong-12 IRBM Failure Y
14 2017-04-16 06:20 Hwasong-12 IRBM Failure
15 2017-04-29 05:33 Hwasong-12 IRBM Failure Y
16 2017-05-14 05:27 Hwasong-12 IRBM Success Y Y
17 2017-07-04 09:38 Hwasong-14 ICBM Success Y
18 2017-07-28 23:41 Hwasong-14 ICBM Success Y Y
19 2017-08-29 05:57 Hwasong-12 IRBM Success Y
20 2017-09-15 06:56 Hwasong-12 IRBM Success Y
21 2017-11-29 03:17 Hwasong-15 ICBM Success Y Y
Note: This table provides a complete list of the North Korean long-range missile tests as
reported in the CNS North Korean Missile Test Database. The date and time of the tests
are based on Korean Standard Time. SLV stands for Satellite Launch Vehicles. IRBM
stands for Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles. ICBM stands for Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles. “Outcome” indicates the test result as documented in the original database.
“Return” column indicates whether the analysis of cumulative return includes each test in
the sample. “Earnings” column indicates whether the analysis of response to earnings
surprises includes each test in the sample.
† This test occurred after trading hours in KRX, thus make a separate observation from
the IRBM test that happenned earlier on the same day.
‡ There was also a failed IRBM test on this day.
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Table 1.3: Descriptives on missile test days and no test days
Test No Test
(1) (2)
Abnormal Return -0.005 -0.001
(0.028) (0.027)
Top Group 0.559 0.568
(0.497) (0.502)
Market Capitalization 854.961 863.872
(1B KRW≈1M USD) (6895.024) (7442.386)
Observations 8375 27391
Number of Announcements 390.000 484.389
(529.289) (651.319)
Number of Active 1532.833 1535.444
Companies (733.827) (682.693)
Observations 6 18
Note: This table presents the summary statistics for the sample used in the analysis of
the response to earnings surprises. Column (1) reports the summary for the missile test
days. Column (2) reports the summary for the trading days without missile tests. “Top
Group” takes a value of 1 if there is an earnings announcement on the trading day with an
earnings surprise in the top quartile that year and 0 if the earnings surprise is in the
bottom quartile or there is no announcement. Standard deviations are reported in the
parentheses.
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Table 1.4: Effect of missile test on response to earnings surprise
Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top Group 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005* 0.005*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Top Group × -0.003** -0.002
Missile Test (0.001) (0.001)
Bottom Group -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Bottom Group × 0.003 0.001
Missile Test (0.002) (0.004)
Top Group × -0.003** -0.002
Success (0.001) (0.001)
Top Group × -0.007*** -0.004
Failure (0.001) (0.003)
Bottom Group × 0.003 0.001
Success (0.002) (0.004)
Bottom Group × 0.000 0.000
Failure (.) (.)
Observations 55373 55373 54950 54950
R2 0.358 0.358 0.360 0.360
Trading Day FE Y Y Y Y
Reference × Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Grouping Procedure 4 Quantiles 4 Quantiles 8 Quantiles 8 Quantiles
Note: This table presents the results of the analysis of the response to earnings surprises.
“Top Group” takes a value of 1 if there is an earnings announcement on the trading day
with an earnings surprise in the top quantile that year and 0 if the earnings surprise is in
the bottom quantile or there is no announcement. “Bottom Group” takes a value of 1 if
there is an earnings announcement on the trading day with an earnings surprise in the
bottom quantile that year and 0 if the earnings surprise is in the top quantile or there is
no announcement. “Missile Test” takes a value of 1 if there is a missile test on the trading
day and 0 if the day is within four trading days before a missile test, excluding the day
before a missile test. “Success” indicates that the test outcome is successful. “Failure”
indicates that the test outcome is a failure. Columns (1) and (2) report results for using
quartiles as the sorting process of earnings surprises. Columns (3) and (4) report results
for using 8 quantiles as the sorting process of earnings surprises. Standard errors are
two-way clustered at the reference missile test and company level and reported in the
parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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A Additional Tables and Figures
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Note: This figure documents the average cumulative return around long-range missile
tests. The cumulative returns are normalized to zero at four trading days before missile
tests.
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Figure A.2: Effect of missile test on cumulative return: 22-day event
window, non-balanced panel
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Note: This figure presents the event study analysis results of the effect of long-range
missiles on cumulative return in the South Korean stock market with a 22-day event
window and a non-balanced panel. In panel (A), dots represent the response to successful
tests, and triangles represent the response to failed tests. In panel (B), dots represent the
difference in the estimates between successful and failed tests. Vertical bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. The sample is not balanced over event time and includes 19
long-range missile tests.
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Table A.1: Effect of missile test on left-wing and right-wing party
support rate by ruling party status
Ruling Party: Left Ruling Party: Right
Left Right Left Right
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Missile Test -0.024* 0.011 0.001 0.006
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005)
Missile Test × 0.051 -0.022 0.055* -0.007
Success (0.030) (0.020) (0.027) (0.007)
Observations 19038 19038 19306 19306
Dep. Var. Mean 0.441 0.106 0.278 0.342
Reference Test FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the difference-in-differences analysis results of the effect of
long-range missiles on the political preferences in South Korea by the ruling party status.
In columns (1) and (2), the sample includes periods when the president was elected from
the main left-wing party. In columns (3) and (4), the sample includes periods when the
president was elected from the main right-wing party. In columns (1) and (3), the
dependent variable is the indicator for supporting the main left-wing party. In columns (2)
and (4), the dependent variable is the indicator for supporting the main right-wing party.
“Missile Test” takes a value of 1 if the polling took place within one week after a missile
test and 0 if the polling took place within one week before a missile test. “Success”
indicates the missile test outcome being successful. Standard errors are clustered at the
reference missile test level and reported in the parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table A.2: Effect of missile test on left-wing and right-wing party
support rate by respondents’ political orientation
Conservative Moderate Progressive
Left Right Left Right Left Right
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Missile Test -0.004 0.006 -0.017 0.019 -0.012 -0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006)
Missile Test × 0.038* -0.026 0.030 -0.038** 0.034 -0.002
Success (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.016) (0.030) (0.009)
Observations 9791 9791 10151 10151 10929 10929
Dep. Var. Mean 0.174 0.457 0.380 0.153 0.569 0.058
Reference Test FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the difference-in-differences analysis results of the effect of
long-range missiles on the political preferences in South Korea by respondents’ political
orientation. In columns (1) and (2), the sample includes observations who respond to have
a progressive ideology. In columns (3) and (4), the sample includes observations who
respond to have a moderate ideology. In columns (5) and (6), the sample includes
observations who respond to have a conservative ideology. In columns (1), (3) and (5), the
dependent variable is the indicator for supporting the main left-wing party. In columns
(2), (4) and (6), the dependent variable is the indicator for supporting the main right-wing
party. “Missile Test” takes a value of 1 if the polling took place within one week after a
missile test and 0 if the polling took place within one week before a missile test. “Success”
indicates the missile test outcome being successful. Standard errors are clustered at the
reference missile test level and reported in the parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table A.3: Effect of missile test on cumulative return
CumulativeReturn
(1) (2)






































Note: This table documents the event study analysis estimates of the effect of long-range
missiles on cumulative return in the South Korean stock market. Column (1) reports the
estimates for each event time indicator. Column (2) reports the estimates for each event
time indicator interacted with the successful test indicator. Standard errors are clustered
at the reference missile test level and reported in the parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Earnings Surprise 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Earnings Surprise -0.002** -0.001**





Observations 56351 56351 56351
R2 0.332 0.352 0.352
Trading Day FE Y Y Y
Reference × Firm FE Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y
Note: This table documents the results of the analysis of the linear response of abnormal
return to earnings surprise quantiles. “Earnings Surprise” equals to 1.5 if company c’s
earnings surprise is in the top quartile in the year, 0.5 for the third quartile, -0.5 for the
second quartile, -1.5 for the bottom quartile, and 0 if there is no earnings announcement.
“Missile Test” takes a value of 1 if there is a missile test on the trading day and 0 if the
day is within four trading days before a missile test, excluding the day before a missile test.
“Success” indicates that the test outcome is successful. “Failure” indicates that the test
outcome is a failure. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the reference missile test
and company level and reported in the parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Chapter 2
Does Cultural Proximity Mitigate the
Effect of Immigration on Electoral
Outcomes? (with Gerard Domènech)
Abstract
We study the effect of immigration on electoral outcomes using individual-level
administrative data in Spain. In a multiple instrumentations framework, we find that
recent immigrants who arrived within two years are associated with an increase in the
vote share of the extremist parties. Such an effect persists for additional two years but
dissipates in the long-term. When split by regions of origin, African immigrants have
the greatest impact, followed by Latin American immigrants. European immigrants
do not affect the extremist vote shares. An analysis of the unemployment rate and the
number of children suggests that immigrants tend to assimilate over time. The findings




In recent years we have witnessed an abrupt change in the political landscapes in
both the United States and many European countries with the emergence of politi-
cians and political parties using virulent rhetoric and radical policy proposals against
immigrants. Researchers have documented that the presence of immigrants is associ-
ated with the increase in electoral support for parties with negative attitudes towards
immigration. However, less is known about the mechanism underlying such a rela-
tionship.
In this paper, we focus on providing empirical evidence on the role of immigrants’
cultural differences and assimilation over time in mitigating the political reactions
to immigration. We disentangle immigrants by their regions of origin and separately
identify their short, medium, and long-term impacts on the vote share of the extremist
parties. To separately identify the causal effects of each subgroup of immigrants, we
construct a set of instruments à la Card (2001) in a multiple instrumentation setting.
Spain offers an interesting context to study the dynamic impact of immigration
from different cultural backgrounds because the country has undergone a fast increase
in the inflow of immigrants from regions with various cultural proximities. Figure 2.1
indicates that immigration to Spain was explosive between the late 1990s to early
2010s. The share of foreign-born in the population increased from less than 2% in
1999 to over 12% in 2009. And figure 2.2 shows that Ibero-America, Africa, and
Europe each account for a significant portion of these immigrants. The intensity and
diversity of immigration facilitate the study of the dynamic effects of immigrants from
various cultural proximities to Spain.
The results suggest that recent immigrants who moved to Spain within two years
increase the vote share of the extremist parties and this short-term effect persists for
two more years since arrival or in the medium-term. However, immigrants who arrived
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between four and eight years before an election decrease the vote share of extremist
parties. In other words, the impact of immigration on the vote share of extremist
parties fades away in the long-term.
Our analysis of immigrants from different regions of origins indicates that recent
immigrants from Africa and Latin America drive the short-term impact on the vote
share of the extremist parties while European immigrants do not display such an
influence. The impact of African and Latin American immigrants also persists in the
medium-term and dissipates in the long-term.
To shed light on the mechanism underlying the dynamic effects of immigration, we
investigate two assimilation measures: the unemployment gap and the activity rate
gap between the natives and the immigrants. The results show that immigration has a
short and medium-term negative effect on the assimilation measures, which dissipates
in the long-term. The analysis is consistent with the hypothesis that assimilation of
immigrants mitigates the impact of immigrants on extremist party vote shares.
Our paper relates to the fast-growing literature studying the impact of immigrant
inflows on electoral outcomes. A common finding in this literature is that immigration
inflows foster support for right-wing and anti-immigration parties. This is the case,
for example, in Halla et al. (2017) for Austria, Barone et al. (2016) for Italy, Gerdes
and Wadensjö (2008) for Denmark, Coffé et al. (2007) for the Netherlands, Brunner
and Kuhn (2018) for Switzerland, Becker and Fetzer (2016) for selected Eastern Euro-
pean countreis, and Tabellini (2020) for the early Twentieth-Century United States.
However, some papers find an opposite effect. For example, Dill (2016) finds that the
share of immigrants decrease the right-wing voting in West Germany and Steinmayr
(2016) finds a similar effect in Austria. Other papers have found that immigration re-
duces support for redistribution among natives (see Dahlberg et al. (2012) for Sweden
and Alesina et al. (2018) for the United States and other developed countries.).
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Despite the consensus on the overall effect of immigration on electoral outcomes,
there is little agreement on the underlying mechanism. A potential mechanism is a
cultural difference between the natives and the immigrants. The natives could be
hostile towards immigrants with different languages or religions and vote for parties
promoting anti-immigration or anti-redistribution policies.1 For example, Mendez and
Cutillas (2014) finds a positive effect of immigration on pro-immigration parties and
explains the result with the cultural proximity of Ibero-american immigrants to native
Spaniards. We add to the literature by constructing complete data of all election types
and analyzing the dynamic effects of immigrants from different origins.
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Immigration in Spain
Immigration in Spain was rare until the 1970s because the country went through
a tough dictatorship that isolated the citizens from the rest of the world. The key
milestones of the opening of the country are the 1978 Constitution, the failed coup of
1981, and the joining of what is now the European Union (EU) in 1986. However, as
indicated in Figure 2.1, it was not until the economic boom of the late 1990s and early
2000s that immigrants started seeing Spain as an attractive destination to migrate.
Since the country became a popular destination for immigration, the inflow quickly
became massive. To illustrate, the change in the fraction of immigrants in the total
population increased from 2% in 1999 to more than 12% in 10 years. Few countries
in the world have experienced immigration inflows of similar magnitudes in such a
short time span.
1For example, see Alesina and Giuliano (2011).
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2.2.2 The Spanish Electoral System
There are four different types of electoral contests that take place in Spain: Municipal
Elections, Regional Elections, National Elections, and European Elections.
Municipal Elections are elections taking place in the over eight thousand munic-
ipalities in the country. The size of a municipality varies. The biggest municipality
in 2017 is Madrid, which has over three million inhabitants registered, whereas the
smallest municipality in the same year was Illán de Vacas (Toledo) with only five
registered inhabitants. Municipal elections take place every four years simultaneously
in all municipalities across the country.
Regional elections take place in the 17 regions (comunidades autónomas) and two
city-regions (Ceuta and Melilla). These elections normally take place every four years
and, in many cases, are held on the same day as municipal elections. However, the
exact election date may vary by region.
National elections are also normally held every four years. In these elections, people
choose their representatives at two legislative chambers, the Congress and the Senate.
The number of seats in Congress is proportional to the population in each region.
The seats in Senate are also allocated proportionally to the regional population, but
smaller regions have larger weights in determining the number of seats.
European elections are held every five years simultaneously in all the European
Union (EU) countries. In these elections, the members of the European Parliament
are chosen. A big share of the existing national legislation (in all EU countries) is
simply a direct translation of the European Directives approved in the European
Parliament.
Spain is a relatively decentralized country with total public spending similarly
divided between the central government, the regions, and the municipalities. Each
administrative level has considerable allocative and legislative powers and, therefore,
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all four elections are politically relevant while different issues would be at stake each
time.
2.2.3 The Party System
Since the restoration of democracy in 1978, the electoral landscape has been dom-
inated by two main parties: The Partido Popular (PP) and the Partido Socialista
Obrero Español (PSOE).
The PP is ideologically in the center-right, with a conservative stand on a number
of issues, such as abortion or secularization, and with liberalistic economic policies
involving less regulation, lower taxes, and a smaller government. The party also gen-
erally opposes immigration-friendly policies, although not in an extreme sense.
The PSOE is ideologically in the center-left, with a progressive stand on social
issues, such as abortion, gender equality, and LGBTQ rights. It also advocates market
regulations and public spending. On immigration, the PSOE is more favorable towards
accepting immigrants into the country than the PP but still does not advocate open
borders.
In addition to the two main parties, there are smaller parties, some at the national
level and some at a smaller regional level. Their popularity and support vary widely
across elections, regions, and over time. A vast majority of the support for these
parties comes from the peripheral regions of the country, including Catalonia, the
Basque Country, Galicia, and Valencia. Their stand on immigration and on other
subjects also vary but, in general, they tend to have a more favorable view towards
migrants than the PP.
We identify the PP and the PSOE as moderate as well as some regional parties
that align with either of the two main parties. Extremist parties include both extreme-
left and extreme-right parties. We identified these parties by going through each of
their policy platforms on their websites. The most notable extreme-left parties are
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Izquierda Unida and Podemos while extreme-right parties include Falange, Partit
Popular de Catalunya, and Vox. As a robustness check, we provide an alternative




The main source for our data on immigrants is the Municipal Registry (Padrón Munic-
ipal). The Municipal Registry is a database containing basic demographic information
(including gender, country of origin, and country of citizenship) for all individuals reg-
istered in a municipality. To register, individuals need to go to their local city council
and show that they are living in the municipality (e.g. by showing an electricity bill
or a rental agreement with their name on it) and proof of identification such as the
national id or a passport.2 Importantly, registering in the municipality is the only way
through which a health card (tarjeta sanitaria) can be obtained and have a doctor
assigned. The health card allows the individual to access the completely free health
care system of the country and, therefore, everyone has the incentive to have their
information in the registry duly updated.
The National Statistical Office (INE) provides tables summarizing the demograph-
ics at different administrative levels since 1996. We scrape the annual release, which
contains detailed information on the country of origin. For privacy reasons, INE only
publishes this information for municipalities with more than ten thousand inhabitants.
Therefore, we restrict our analysis to these municipalities, which are 557 municipali-
ties in total.
We complement the registry data with the 1981 and 1991 census data, which we
2Therefore, individuals can register independently on their legal status, as long as they can prove
their residence in the municipality.
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use to obtain the initial share of immigrants by country of origin in the base year
when constructing the instrument variables.
2.3.2 Elections Data
Most of the electoral data used in our analysis are publicly available from the Ministry
of Interior website. This source contains the complete electoral results for Municipal,
National and European Elections at the municipality level. Specifically, for each mu-
nicipality and election, we can observe the number of votes obtained by each party and
how many of these translated into seats to the City Council, the National Parliament,
or the European Parliament, respectively.
The data for the Regional Elections in each of the 19 regions in the country are
available on the webpages of their statistical offices. We scrape each of these websites
one-by-one to construct complete regional election result data.
2.4 Methodology
For the analysis of the dynamic effects of immigration, our preferred empirical speci-




LIMM(L)jt + λp(j) + λte + γXjt + εjt,
(2.1)
where Yjte is the change in the vote share of the extremist parties since the last
election in municipality j in election type e, IMM(S)jt is the short-term immigrant
inflow in municipality j between t and t− 2, IMM(M)jt is the medium-term lagged
immigrant inflow in municipality j between t − 2 and t − 4, and IMM(L)jt is the
long-term lagged immigrant inflow in municipality j between t − 4 and t − 8, λp(j)
is the province fixed effect, λte is the year times election type fixed effect, Xjt is the
control vector including lagged log wage, lagged unemployment rate, and lagged share
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of high school graduates in municipality j at t− 4, and εjt is the error term clustered
at the level of 50 provinces in Spain.
We hypothesize that more recent immigrants have a higher positive impact on the
vote share of the extremist parties:
βS > βM > βL. (2.2)
As the locational choice of immigrants may correlate with the natives’ political
preferences, we instrument the immigration variables with shift-share variables. (De-
tailed discussion in Section 2.4.1). Due to the lack of power of the instruments in the
preferred specification, we separately test
(1)βS+M > 0, (2.3)
(2)βS > βM , (2.4)
(3)βS+M > βL. (2.5)
For the analysis of the effect of immigrants by regions of origin, our preferred





βP,EU15EU15(P )jt + β




+ λp(j) + λte + γXj,t + εj,t, (2.6)
where EU15(P )jt is the immigrant inflow in municipality j from the original 15 EU
member states3, REU(P )jt is the immigrant inflow in municipality j from the rest of
EU member states, LAM(P )jt is the immigrant inflow in municipality j from Latin
American countries, and AFR(P )jt is the immigrant inflow in municipality j from
3These include the member states as of 1995: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,




We hypothesize that immigrants from a region that is culturally closer to Spain
have a lower positive impact on the vote share of the extremist parties in the short-
term:
βS,EU15 < βS,REU , βS,LAM < βS,AFR. (2.7)
We also expect the same dynamic effects as for the aggregate immigrants from each
regional subset of immigrants. However, due to the lack of power of the instruments,
we separately test
(1)βS,EU15 < βS,REU , βS,LAM < βS,AFR, (2.8)
(2)βS+M,Region > βL,Region, (2.9)
where Region ∈ {EUR,LAM,AFR} and EUR includes countries in EU15 or REU .




GAP IMM(S)jt + β
M
GAP IMM(M)jt + β
L
GAP IMM(L)jt + λp(j) + λte + γXjt + εjt,
(2.10)
where Yjt is the outcome variable including the unemployment rate gap and the
activity rate gap between the native and the foreign-born inhabitants in municipality
j in year t.
We hypothesize that more recent immigrants have a higher positive impact on the







2.4.1 Instrumenting Immigrants’ Location Choices
The commonly known “Shift-Share” instrument relies on the intuitive idea that im-
migrants make their location choices partly based on past settlements of immigrants
from a similar origin. The instrument predicts current local immigrant inflows by com-
bining the national level inflow of immigrants from each country of origin (“shift”)
with their respective past settlement choices (“share”). The identification comes from
the assumption that neither the national shift nor the past settlement share will be
correlated with the confounding factors of the local outcome variable. The standard









where ˜IMM j,t,t−k is the predicted inflow of immigration in municipality j between
years t and t − k, IMM−jo,t,t−k is the national inflow of immigrants from origin o
arriving between t and t− k excluding municipality j, zoj is the share of immigrants
from origin o in municipality j in the base year of 1981, and Popj,t−k is the population
in municipality j in t− k.
As we aim to identify the dynamic effects of immigrants, we construct multiple

























where ˜IMM(S)jt is the expected short-term immigrant inflow in municipality j be-
tween t and t− 2, ˜IMM(M)jt is the expected medium-term lagged immigrant inflow
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in municipality j between t− 2 and t− 4, and ˜IMM(L)jt is the expected long-term
lagged immigrant inflow in municipality j between t− 4 and t− 8.

































where P ∈ {S,M,L}, ˜EU15(P )jt is the expected immigrant inflow in municipality j
from the original 15 EU member states4, ˜REU(P )jt is the expected immigrant inflow
in municipality j from the rest of EU member states, ˜LAM(P )jt is the expected
immigrant inflow in municipality j from Latin American countries, and ˜AFR(P )jt is
the expected immigrant inflow in municipality j from African countries. The “shift”
components for each region is self-explanatory.
To address the potential under-identification problem of multiple instrumentations
discussed in Jaeger et al. (2018), we report the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) LM
under-identification test statistics in all of our instrumental variable results presented
in Section 2.5.
A common concern on the shift-share instrument arises when the past settlement
share correlates with the confounding factors of the outcome variables (Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al., 2018). Therefore, we set the base year of 1981, which is just after the
democratization and before the immigration wave. As the Spanish political landscape
went through significant changes, including the de facto restoration of democracy
4These include the member states as of 1995: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom
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after the failed coup in 1981 and joining the EU in 1986, it is less likely that the
immigration pattern in 1981 correlates with the electoral outcomes in the 1990s and
2000s.
2.5 Results
We report the summary statistics of the main explanatory and independent variables
in Table 2.1. The standard deviations of the explanatory variables are between 0.01
and 0.03, which should be noted when interpreting the magnitude of the regression
coefficients.
The first stage results of the analysis of the dynamic effects of aggregate immigra-
tion are reported in Table 2.2. Column 1 reports the first stage result for specification
(2.3), columns 2 and 3 report the first stage for specification (2.4), and columns 4 and
5 report the first stage for specification (2.5). The diagonal terms indicate whether
each instrument is a good predictor of the corresponding explanatory variable it is
supposed to predict. In all specifications, we see a strong correlation between the
instruments and the explanatory variables. We also report the Sanderson and Wind-
meijer (2016) multivariate F-statistic to test the weak identification and none of the
endogenous regressors raises the concern.
In Table 2.3, we present the effect of aggregate immigration on extreme parties’
vote share. Columns 1 and 2 report the OLS and IV results for specification (2.3)
where short and mid-term effects are pooled, columns 3 and 4 report the results for
specification (2.4) where they are separated, and columns 5 and 6 report the results
for specification (2.5) where the long-term effects are included. The Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) rk LM test results are strong for each of the IV specifications, indicating
the lack of the under-identification problem.
Our preferred specifications are columns 4 and 6. In column 4, we see that a
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standard deviation increase in the short-term immigration accounts for a 0.9
In Table 2.4, we report the first stage results for the analysis of the effect of
immigration from different regions of origin. To be concise, we only report the first
stage result for the full specification where both short and medium-term immigration
from all regions are included as explanatory variables. The diagonal terms indicate the
strength of the instrument. Both the coefficients and the Sanderson and Windmeijer
(2016) multivariate F-statistics exhibit a strong first stage.
In Table 2.5, we report the corresponding regression outputs. Columns 1 and 2
report the results for specification (2.8), columns 3 and 4 report the results for the
same specification but with medium-term immigrants, and columns 5 and 6 report
the results when both short and medium-term immigrants are included. The IV spec-
ifications pass the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM test. In column 2, we find that
immigrants from African origins have the strongest impact on the extreme parties’
vote share, while immigrants from Latin America also exhibit a significant increase.
A standard deviation increase in the African immigrants results in a striking 7% in-
crease in the extreme party vote share in the municipality. The effects of African and
Latin American immigrants persist for another two years as the results in columns 4
and 6 suggest.
In Tables 2.6 and 2.7, we report the first stage and regression results for specifi-
cation (2.9) that includes long-term immigrants from each region of origin. The first
stage results are strong except for the long-term immigrants from Latin America.
Results in column 6 of Table 2.7 indicate that the short and medium-term effect of
African immigrants dissipates in the long-term. The OLS result for long-term immi-
grants from Latin America in column 3 also suggests a corresponding dissipation, but
the IV result is statistically insignificant due to under-identification.
Finally, in Table ??, we report the results for the analysis of the underlying mecha-
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nism. In column 2, the results indicate that medium-term immigrants increase the gap
in unemployment between immigrants and natives but the impact dissipates in the
long-run. The results on the gap in the number of children in column 4 are noisy but
the coefficients suggest that short-term immigrants increase the gap while medium
and long-term immigrants decrease it. The results provide suggestive evidence that
immigrants tend to assimilate to natives over time.
2.6 Conclusions
We find that immigrants who arrived in Spain within two years are associated with
an increase in the vote share of the extremist parties. Such an effect persists in the
medium-term but dissipates in the long-term. When split by regions of origin, the
African immigrants have the strongest impact, while Latin American immigrants
also affect the natives’ political preferences. However, European immigrants do not
have an impact on the extremist vote shares. An analysis of the unemployment rate
and the number of children suggests that immigrants tend to assimilate over time and
close the gap. The findings are consistent with our hypothesis that cultural proximity
mitigates the effect of immigration on extremist party vote shares.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean SD
Extreme Parties’ Vote Share Change 7730 0.034 0.106
Ext-Left Parties’ Vote Share Change 7730 0.032 0.102
Ext-Right Parties’ Vote Share Change 7730 0.002 0.026
Foreign-born over Population 7730 0.087 0.075
IMM (S) 7730 0.004 0.023
IMM (M) 7730 0.011 0.023
IMM (L) 7730 0.026 0.035
EU15 (S+M) 7730 0.002 0.016
REU (S+M) 7730 0.006 0.015
LAM (S+M) 7730 0.003 0.015
AFR (S+M) 7730 0.004 0.010
EU15 (L) 7730 0.004 0.013
REU (L) 7730 0.008 0.014
LAM (L) 7730 0.007 0.013


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Dynamic Effects of Immigrants on Extreme Parties’ Vote
Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IMM (S+M) 0.096*** 0.161 0.138*** 0.170
[0.028] [0.122] [0.033] [0.124]
IMM (S) 0.116** 0.381**
[0.052] [0.190]




Model OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Obs 7730 7730 7730 7730 7730 7730
R-sq 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48
K-P rk LM 26.85 32.96 17.55
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: Controls include: lagged unemployment rate, lagged share of high education,
lagged wage, as well as year, region and election-type fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the province level in parentheses. *, ** and * indicate statistical significance






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Short and Medium-term Effects of Immigrants on Extreme
Parties’ Vote Share by Region of Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU15 (S) -0.115* -0.198 -0.167** -0.278
[0.062] [0.157] [0.067] [0.202]
REU (S) 0.029 -0.105 0.186 0.517
[0.110] [0.614] [0.123] [0.688]
LAM (S) 0.932*** 4.203** 0.771*** 4.262**
[0.189] [1.749] [0.186] [1.674]
AFR (S) 0.280 7.197*** 0.253 6.130***
[0.175] [2.297] [0.169] [1.722]
EU15 (M) 0.085 -0.364 0.138 -0.008
[0.091] [0.361] [0.091] [0.245]
REU (M) -0.338***-0.465 -0.428***-0.804
[0.122] [0.374] [0.140] [0.557]
LAM (M) 0.525*** 3.080 0.224* 0.582
[0.129] [2.135] [0.119] [1.527]
AFR (M) 0.276*** 0.795* 0.269** 0.535
[0.095] [0.481] [0.112] [0.627]
Model OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Obs 7730 7730 7730 7730 7730 7730
R-sq 0.49 0.36 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.37
K-P rk LM 12.03 7.69 9.37
(p-value) (0.0005) (0.0055) (0.0022)
Notes: Controls include: lagged unemployment rate, lagged share of high education,
lagged wage, as well as year, region and election-type fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the province level in parentheses. *, ** and * indicate statistical significance
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Dynamic Effects of Immigrants on Extreme Parties’ Vote
Share by Region of Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








AFR (S+M) 0.392*** 2.312***
[0.096] [0.583]
AFR (L) -0.173* -2.102***
[0.104] [0.630]
Model OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Obs 7730 7730 7730 7730 7730 7730
R-sq 0.49 0.49 0.49 -0.50 0.49 0.46
K-P rk LM 35.06 1.27 9.69
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.2601) (0.0019)
Notes: Controls include: lagged unemployment rate, lagged share of high education,
lagged wage, as well as year, region and election-type fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the province level in parentheses. *, ** and * indicate statistical significance
at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Dynamic Effects of Immigration on Outcome Gaps
Unemployment Rate Gap No. of Children Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMM (S) -0.271 0.408 -2.275 4.021
[0.298] [1.761] [1.968] [5.737]
IMM (M) 0.295 4.036** 0.759 -1.219
[0.214] [1.634] [1.703] [6.779]
IMM (L) 0.473** -2.224* 0.661 -1.072
[0.211] [1.144] [0.900] [4.371]
Model OLS IV OLS IV
Dep Var Mean 0.096 0.096 0.368 0.368
K-P LM (p-value) 0.039 0.039
R-sq 0.540 0.194 0.513 0.499
Obs 700 700 700 700
Notes: Controls include: lagged unemployment rate, lagged share of high education,
lagged wage, as well as province and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the region level in parentheses. *, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Daddy Quota on Gender
Labor Market Outcomes (with Petra
Niedermayerova)
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of a father-specific parental leave policy on labor
market outcomes. In 2006, Quebec reformed their parental leave policy to include up
to three weeks of paid paternity leave that is not transferable to the mother. Using
a province-level difference-in-difference approach, we find that the so-called daddy
quota increased the probability of employment for women and decreased the wage
of younger men. In a theoretical framework, we show that policy-driven changes in
gender norms are consistent with our findings. The results suggest that daddy quota
promoted equal opportunities for women in the labor market.
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3.1 Introduction
In the developed economies, parental leave is typically a gender neutral policy that,
in theory, enables parents to share their absence from the labor market due to the
family-related responsibilities. Although the generosity and structure of these policies
vary, in all of the OECD countries women are more likely than men to stay on the
parental leave. The gender difference in parental leave take-up is distinctive in major-
ity of OECD countries. Men represent around one in five parents who take advantage
of the paid publicly-administered parental leave. (OECD, 2016) The existing litera-
ture has mostly focused on the direct effects of parental leave policies on parents of
young children, providing evidence of improvement in both parental and child out-
comes.1 The studies however do not consider the indirect effects on gender disparities
in the labor market, which are caused by the differential take-up of parental leave
between mothers and fathers.
In the study, we investigate the effect of a father-specific parental leave policy reform
in Quebec on four broad demographic groups, which are not necessarily directly af-
fected by the parental leave. We will consider two distinct channels, through which
the reform may affect gender labor market outcomes - statistical discrimination and
gender norms. First, the statistical discrimination channel relates to the expected
productivity of workers from each demographic group. Employers who are obliged to
provide job protection and other parental leave benefits to mothers incur additional
costs when hiring them. These costs include hiring and training temporary employees
to substitute mothers for the duration of their parental leave. It is not surprising,
then, that firms may engage in discriminatory behavior against women in childbear-
ing age who may potentially request a parental leave in the future. The employers
would generally offer lower wages to younger women than those who are from other
1Parental leave is specially critical for single parents.
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demographic groups but have similar skills. In the end, the very policy that helps
mothers return to the labor market and strengthen their labor market attachment
may cause employers to favor male employees.
Second, the design of parental leave policy may be able to affect the gender norms in
the society. The dominant parental leave take-up of women promotes the traditional
view on family, with a male breadwinner and a female caretaker. Such gender norms
can make it challenging for women to participate in the labor market while having
young children, as they can be seen as bad mothers who do not provide sufficient child
care. Furthermore, it may be difficult for career-oriented mothers to take days-off and
demand work flexibly if they do not want to be stigmatized as another female worker
pursuing the mommy track.2
Some countries have reformed their parental leave policies in the effort to reduce the
gender gap in take-up rates. The programs are typically referred to as the father-
specific parental leave, paternity leave or the daddy quota. In the analysis, we exploit
a reform in Quebec, the Quebec Parental Insurance Program (QPIP), which signif-
icantly increased the take-up of parental leave by fathers. The 2006 QPIP reform
established up to five weeks of the daddy quota, which, we believe, provides an opti-
mal environment to study the effect of parental leave take-up. First, the impact of the
reform on father’s participation has been enormous, which is not typically the case
for gender neutral parental leave expansions. The proportion of fathers claiming or
intending to claim the benefit rose from 22% in 2004 to 83% in 2013, which contrasts
a modest increase from 9% to 13.3% in the rest of Canada. (Lero, 2015) Second,
with the introduction of QPIP, Quebec has become the only province in Canada with
family policy that includes a paternity leave, which enables us to compare the labor
outcomes in Quebec to the remaining provinces. Lastly, there is a large evidence of
2A common expression for a career of women who prioritize home production, and therefore is
willing to make career sacrifices such as declining promotions, or reducing work hours.
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gender gap in the Canadian labor market. In spite of the fact that women exceed men
in the amount of education, gender wage gap and glass ceiling phenomenon persist.
(OECD, 2012) Therefore QPIP represents an opportunity to examine the evolution
of gender gap in labor market following a parental leave policy reform.
Due to the features of QPIP and our dataset, we employ a difference-in-difference
technique as our main empirical strategy. Our results suggest that QPIP leads to a
significant increase in the probability of being employed for younger and older women
in Quebec, while leaving the probability of employment for men unchanged. We take
into account variety of specifications, and conduct a robustness check in order to ver-
ify that the results are driven by the QPIP reform.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the effects of
paternity leave on women in childbearing age, and one of the few studies that consider
the effect family-related policy on women in childbearing age. Additionally, we pro-
vide a simple theoretical framework, which formally defines the mechanism through
which the paternity leave indirectly affects the gender differences in labor market
outcomes.
The study is organized in the following way: Section 3.2 discusses related literature
and Section 3.3 provides background to QPIP. The theoretic framework is provided
in Section 3.4, and Section 3.5 presents the empirical strategy and results. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Recent research focuses on the effect that family programs have on parental and child
outcomes. First, studies evaluate the effectiveness of paid parental leave extension
on child’s development and welfare. Baker and Milligan (2010) find that while the
leave expansion in Canadian context increased the time mothers spend with their
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children during the first year of their life, they did not find an impact on children
development. Rossin (2011) finds that the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act led to
a small increase in birth weight and decrease in the likelihood of premature birth in
the US. Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) focus on the impact of three expansions in
leave coverage in Germany. They find no evidence that expansion in maternity leave
coverage impacted child’s long term outcomes.
Second branch of the parental leave research examines how duration of the paid fam-
ily leave affects the labor opportunities faced by parents as they return to the labor
market. The proponents of paid parental leave claim that the policy encourages gen-
der equality as it allows mothers to retain occupation-specific human capital and
match-specific search capital after the childbirth (Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014).
The opponents of a more generous paid parental leave argue, that the extensions in
parental leave duration are associated with loss of human capital, work network, and
self-confidence. All of these reduce parents’ chances of resuming their careers. Since
parental leave is taken predominantly by mothers, these studies generally investigate
female labor market outcomes. Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) shows that the California’s
Paid Parental Leave Program (CPFL) increased the use of maternity leave without
worsening mothers’ labor market outcomes. The authors find an increase in the work
hours and provide some evidence of a growth in the wage income. Lalive et al. (2014)
analyzes a series of parental leave extensions in Austria and concludes that the poli-
cies led to significant delays in return to work. Tô (2018) studies a parental leave
policy extending the maximum duration in Denmark and finds that statistical dis-
crimination due to the signaling role of parental leave contributes to a divergence in
gender wage gap.
Existing studies that are most closely related to our research question consider the
effects that parental leave policy have on women in childbearing age in the labor
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market. Ruhm (1998) investigates the impact of parental leave length on female labor
market outcomes in nine European countries. He finds that while extended parental
leave increases employment of women, it may hurt their wages. Das and Polachek
(2015) estimate the effect of CPFL on younger women’s labor force participation and
unemployment. They show that labor force participation of young women increases
but their unemployment rate and unemployment duration increase. Thomas (2016)
constructs an adverse selection model and test its implications empirically to shows
that mandated maternity leave policies benefit women in childbearing age in terms
of higher probability of remaining employed, however significantly limit their chances
to be promoted. Dunatchik and Özcan (2020) studies the effect of QPIP on mothers’
labor force participation and finds that, compared to the neighboring province of On-
tario, Quebec mothers are more likely to participate in the labour market and work
full-time. Tô (2018)
Other closely related branch of parental leave literature focuses on the effect of
parental leave reforms on father’s participation in childcare. Bartel et al. (2018) use
CPFL to track the behavior of fathers. Their findings suggest that men indeed re-
spond to the expanded parental leave opportunities. Finally, Patnaik (2019) analyze
the effect of QPIP and finds that father’s take-up increased drastically. Moreover, the
provision of father-specific parental leave reduced the stigma associated with men’s
active participation in childcare. Patnaik’s (2019) results suggest that QPIP reduced
the gender specialization within families, as parents’ contribution to housework be-
came more equal. These findings provide a rationale for utilizing QPIP in our analysis.
We posses an evidence that QPIP significantly altered gender differential take-up of
parental leave as well as some aspects of the gender roles within a family.
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3.3 Background
The Employment Insurance (EI) program, one of the largest federal programs, used to
provide parental benefits in all provinces in Canada. In the beginning of 2006, Quebec
replaced EI with its Quebec Parental Insurance Plan, from then on providing eligible
workers with maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave or adoption leave. Both
EI and QPIP are financed by payroll taxes, and include a job-protecting provision.
QPIP made the family benefits more generous, accessible and flexible. The EI’s crite-
ria for eligibility include 600 hours of insurable work, an employee status, and offers
C$39,000 maximum insurable earnings. QPIP requires minimum of C$2,000 insurable
earnings, which extended the eligibility to parents with non-standard employment,
who did not fulfill the EI’s hourly criteria. Additionally, QPIP offers benefits to self-
employed workers and maximum insurable earnings of C$57,000. QPIP lets families
choose from two plans - basic or special plan. The basic plan includes lower benefits
for longer period (maximum 18 maternity weeks and 32 parental weeks), whereas the
special plan shortens the benefit period while providing higher benefits (15 maternity
weeks and 25 weeks). (Gouvernement du Québec, 2018) Altogether, these changes
allowed more parents to take advantage of the parental benefits, and provided par-
ticipating parents with larger compensation of foregone wages.
Crucially for this study, Quebec has become the only province with a portion of the
parental leave designated specifically to fathers. The basic plan offers up to five con-
secutive weeks of paternity leave with the wage replacement rate of 70%. The special
plan includes up to three consecutive weeks of paternity leave compensated with a
75% replacement rate. The paternity leave can begin as early as during the week of
child’s birth, and has to end no later than 52 weeks after the birth. The total amount
of parental leave weeks available to fathers increased from 35 to 37.3 The maximum
3The total amount includes five weeks of paternity leave and 32 weeks of gender neutral parental
leave.
67
length of parental leave available to mothers was not affected by the transition from
EI to QPIP. In total, mothers’ paid leave contains 18 weeks of maternity leave and
up to 32 weeks of parental leave. Overall, maximum family leave increased from 50
weeks to 55 weeks. Parents have the option to stay on the leave at the same time or
in succession.
Our analysis largely follows Patnaik’s (2019) finding that establishing the daddy
quota, in fact, made fathers stay on parental leave significantly longer. Based on
her analysis, QPIP led to 53 percentage points increase in father’s claim rate along
with an increase in the leave duration of three weeks. Following QPIP, average father
stayed on the paternity leave for five weeks, that is, the amount of time allocated ex-
clusively to fathers by the daddy quota. In comparison, Patnaik (2019) finds positive,
but insignificant effect of QPIP reform on both participation rate and average leave
duration of mothers. Although the reform did not eliminate the differential uptake of
the paid parental leave, it contributed to its reduction.
In our analysis, we assume that younger women are only affected by the QPIP through
the establishment of daddy quota. We may worry that the generosity of QPIP causes
even larger participation of mothers, thus enriching employment options for women
without children. Patnaik’s (2019) evidence however does not support such hypoth-
esis, as the leave-taking behavior of mothers has not been significantly altered by
QPIP. Alternatively, we may worry that the larger financial incentives of QPIP affect
fertility decisions of younger single women. It could be the case that younger women
who would otherwise work, decide to start a family sooner due to the favorable family
policy. Patnaik (2019) addresses the possibility of change in fertility choices, and does
not find support for it in the analysis.
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3.4 Model
This section describes a simple static model that provides a framework for under-
standing the impacts of QPIP on labor market outcomes. The model distinguishes
between statistical discrimination channel and gender norm channel, and shows that
the latter plays a primary role in the increase of female employment in the equilibrium.
Household’s labor supply:
Each household i, an element of the finite set of households, I, has two members,
female and male, and differs from other households only in the age of the family
members, a(i) ∈ {Y,O}4, and the heterogeneous gender norm effect, γi(·), which
will be described below. The share of young household is α. Each household’s utility
function is as follows:







− γi(Q)χ{LFi > 0}. (3.1)
For each member g ∈ {F,M} in household i, wgi is the wage in the labor market,
Lgi is the amount of labor supply, and γi(Q) is the fixed utility cost of female labor
force participation before (Q = 0) and after (Q = 1) the QPIP reform, borrowed from
Thomas (2016). However, unlike Thomas (2016), we introduce heterogeneity to the
participation cost. In specific, γi(Q) = µa(i)(Q) + ε where µO(1) < µO(0) < µY (1) <
µY (0) and ε ∼ Uniform[−12 ,
1
2
]. The assumptions include that the reform reduced
the participation cost for both older and younger women, and that the older women’s
participation cost is generally lower than younger women. Each household’s optimal
4We assume that both family members have the same ‘age’.
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labor supply given the wages and the fixed utility costs would be as follows:
LSFi(wFi; γi(Q)) = wFiχ{wFi ≥
√
2γi(Q)}, (3.2)
LSMi(wMi) = wMi. (3.3)
Note that the female member’s labor force participation will be determined by the
relative level of wage and fixed utility cost of participation, while the male member
works for any positive wage.
Labor market equilibrium:
We assume that each worker’s expected productivity in household i follows θgi = θg,a(i)
for g = F,M, or that the expected productivity of each individual depends only on
the age and the gender. We also assume that the labor market is competitive and the
firms have the following production function:5
F ({LFi, LMi}i∈I ; {wFi, wMi, θFi, θMi}i∈I) =
∑
i∈I
[LFi(θFi − wFi) + LMi(θMi − wMi)].
(3.4)






gi for i ∈ I, g = F,M ,
5Note that we are abusing the notation for the expected productivity θgi in the production
function. This would generate no further complications as the expected production would be equal
to the production function with expected productivity in our case.
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given Q = 0, 1 would be described as follows:
w∗g,a(i) = θg,a(i), (3.5)
l∗M,Y = θM,Y · αI, (3.6)
l∗M,O = θM,O · (1− α)I, (3.7)
l∗F,Y (Q) = θF,Y · αI · ΦY (Q), (3.8)
l∗F,O(Q) = θF,O · (1− α)I · ΦO(Q), (3.9)













, which stands for the
labor force participation rate of women with age a(i), given Q = 0, 1. Note that Φa(i)
is weakly decreasing in µa(i).
Effects of QPIP reform:
There are two main effects of the reform on the labor market. First, since younger men
enjoy more weeks of leave, their expected productivity decreases. This is the statistical
discrimination channel we discussed above. Second, because QPIP challenges the
traditional gender norms, younger women face lower barrier to participate in the
labor market. More importantly, because of the flexible usage of parental leaves after
the reform, the overall workplace flexibility increases so that the fixed utility cost of
participating in the labor force decreases for women.
The statistical discrimination channel can be traced through equation (3.5) and
where the productivity loss for young men results in their wage to drop. On the
other hand, the workplace flexibility channel increases both young and old women’s
employment as can be seen in equations (3.8) and (3.9). The employment increase
would be greater for the younger age group whose workplace flexibility is affected
more directly by the reform. Hence, our two main implications of the model would
be as follows:
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(1) Statistical discrimination: young men’s wage will decrease,
(2) Workplace flexibility: women’s employment will increase, and more so for young
women.
In the following section, we will discuss the empirical strategy and see if the
findings are consistent with the implications of the model.
3.5 Empirical Exercise
3.5.1 Empirical Method
In the empirical analysis of the QPIP reform, we use the Canadian Labour Force
Survey (LFS) from 2002 to 2010. LFS is a large monthly survey, which consists of a
nationally-representative sample. LFS uses a rotating panel sample design, and in-
cludes employment and unemployment information. We construct four demographic
groups: women/men between 17 and 44 years old with no or younger children (the
youngest child below 5 years) and women/men between 50 and 64 years old with no
or older children (the youngest child at least 13 years old). We employ a difference-in-
difference strategy in order to determine whether daddy quota affected labor market
outcomes of each of the four groups in Quebec. The pre-reform group consists of the
2002 - 2005 data, and the 2006 - 2010 data serve as the post-reform group. Quebec
is the only province in Canada that provided an individual non-transferable right to
the parental leave for fathers. Therefore, Quebec represents our treated group while
other Canadian provinces serve as the control group.6 The outcome of interest is a
binary variable Employed, constructed according to employment definition of the In-
ternational Labour Organisation.
In order to identify the causal effect of QPIP using the difference-in-difference tech-
6We combine the remaining provinces into the following five regions: Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba
and Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Atlantic Region.
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nique, it must be the case that in the reform’s absence, Quebec and the remaining
provinces’ labor market outcomes would follow the same trend. Figure 3.1 plots the
probability of being employed for each groups, separately for Quebec and the rest of
Canada from 2002 to 2014. The likelihood of employment in Quebec is smaller for
all groups except of the younger women. The pre-trends are aligned, which suggest
that the Canadian provinces represent an appropriate control group for Quebec in
this study. Also, in the case of younger women, we observe a widening of the gap
in probability of employment between Quebec and rest of the provinces after 2006,
which is consistent with the timing of QPIP. However, in the empirical analysis, we
need to consider a potential confounding factor, that is, the significant movement in
the business cycle during the post-period. Particularly, Canada entered a recession
in 2008, which would bias our analysis, if the impact of economic downturn differed
across provinces. I further analyze the issue in the Robustness Check.
As a starting point of the empirical strategy, we present the characteristics of the
sample. Table 3.1 includes summary statistics of the selected variables separately
for Quebec and control groups before the QPIP reform. Quebec’s overall labor force
participation rate and probability of employment are both below the rest of Canada
during the pre-treatment period. The differences in education, age, marital status,
and probability of having children are relatively small in their magnitude and we
control for these characteristics in every specification of the following exercise.
The main empirical analysis starts with the baseline difference in difference re-
gression:
Yipt = α + β ∗ Aftert ∗Quebecp + γ ∗Quebecp + δ ∗ Aftert + φ ∗Xipt + εipt , (3.10)
where Yipt represents an outcome of interest for a person i living in a province p
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surveyed in a year t. It takes value one if the individual is employed and zero otherwise.
δt and λp denote the year and province fixed effects.Quebecp is a binary variable taking
the value of one when the individual lives in Quebec, and Aftert takes value of one
when the individual is present in the dataset after the QPIP reform, that is 2006 or
later. Xipt is a set of personal characteristics including age education level marital
status and presence/age of child, εipt is the error term. Standard errors are clustered
at the province-year level to account for random shocks affecting individuals in a each
province every year.
The generalized difference in difference regression with fixed effects takes the following
form:
Yipt = α + β ∗Quebecp ∗ Aftert + φ ∗Xipt + δt + λp + εipt. (3.11)
Since the sample consists of multiple provinces and periods, the second specification
adds terms δt and λp, denoting the year and province fixed effects. δt accounts for
differences over time that are common to all provinces, while λp captures differences
between the provinces, which are constant over time.
Final specification relaxes the common effect of QPIP for all years, and instead allows
for year specific effects of QPIP:
Yipt = α + βt ∗Quebecp ∗ Y eart + φ ∗Xipt + δt + λp + εipt. (3.12)
In all three specifications, β represents the coefficient of interest. In the first two spec-
ification it is equal to the average treatment effect of QPIP reform on the employment
in Quebec. In the last specification, βt contains a specific value of QPIP’s effect for
each year of interest.
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3.5.2 Results
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 3.2 present results of the empirical exercise for younger and
older women. The two columns of each group’s results represent the coefficients from
the specifications (1) and (2) respectively. The coefficient of interest is positive and
significant in both specifications for both groups. The magnitude and significance of
the QPIP effect increases with the inclusion of fixed effects.
The regression results of specification (3) are included Table 3.3. Figure 3.2 depicts
the yearly coefficients for each group graphically, which allows for an easier interpreta-
tion. Consistent with our hypothesis, the likelihood of female employment in Quebec
was not significantly different from other provinces before the reform, and starting
in 2007, it became significantly higher than in the control provinces. The gradual
increase of QPIP’s effect is expected, as the mechanism through which the reform
affects gender labor market outcomes require an adjustment period. The employers
need to observe that fathers spend more time taking care of their children, and, at
least temporarily, reduce their labor supply. Father’s behavior therefore resembles
mother’s behavior when it comes to the reduction in the labor supply associated with
the family responsibilities. The adjustment of labor division in families represents a
rather gradual process, and the employers update their expectations about the labor
attachment of their male and female employees as more families are exposed to QPIP.
Table 3.2 also presents the results of an analogous empirical exercise for younger and
older men in columns 5 to 8. We do not find a significant effect of QPIP on the
probability of being employed for either male group. Similarly, Figure 3.2 reveals the
male yearly coefficients from specification (3) are dominantly non-significant.
The effect of QPIP on wages of the four demographic groups are presented in Table
3.4. The difference-in-difference estimates indicate that the reform had a negative
impact on wages of younger women, older women, and younger men. The decrease
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in women’s wages can be explained by the increase in their employment, while the
decrease in younger men’s wages is a result of the statistical discrimination channel
included in the model. The wage of older men is not significantly affected by the
reform.
3.5.3 Robustness Check: Bartik instrument
Our results could be driven by varying responses to macroeconomic shocks. It is
important to note that during 2008 and 2009 Canada was impacted by the Great
Recession. The significant downturn may represent a confounding factor in the esti-
mation of QPIP’s effects on the labor market outcomes. For example, Quebec may
respond to the recession differently than the remaining Canadian provinces due to
its industry composition. In order to test whether the results are driven by the dif-
ferential response to the business cycle, we construct the so called Bartik instrument
and include it as an additional control variable in the preferred specifications of the
main analysis. The instrument is constructed as the average national employment
growth across the industries weighted by the local industry employment shares. The
co-variate captures the local labor demand unrelated to the changes in local labor




epit−1(lnE−pit − lnE−pit−1) (3.13)
In the formula above, epit represents the share of province p’s employment in industry
i in year t. E−pit stands for the national employment in industry i in year t excluding
province p’s employment in that industry. While the results in Table 3.5 confirms the
importance of Bartik instrument, the main results persists.
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3.6 Conclusion
In the past decades, the labor force participation as well as the labor force attach-
ment of women have undergone substantial changes. Women nowadays enjoy higher
degrees of economic independence and lower amount of labor market barriers due to
the changing gender norms. Despite the progress, research documents a persistence
of gender differences in labor market outcomes: the glass ceiling, occupational segre-
gation as well as the gender wage gap to name a few. It is therefore important for
policy makers to identify policies that eliminate the remaining disadvantages faced by
women in the labor market, thereby further advancing the economic status of women
in our society.
The child-rearing responsibilities play a significant role in defining the long-run gender
differences in the labor market. Parental leave policies present powerful public policy
tools, with a potential to influence the division of child-related responsibilities. The
economic literature has mostly focused on a fraction of the complex effects, which
parental leave policy design may have. In the study, we investigate the effects that
a father-specific parental leave policy reform in Quebec has on demographic groups,
which may not be directly affected by it. We find that through increasing fathers’
take-up of parental leave, the QPIP reform increases the likelihood of employment
for women of all ages. The result is consistent with the change in gender norms,
which reduces barriers to employment for women. We also find a reduction in the
wage caused by the QPIP for all groups but older men. The reduction in younger
men’s wages suggest that father-specific parental leave also reduces statistical dis-
crimination in the labor market. The reduction in women’s wage is consequence of
an increased competition in the labor market. Overall, our findings suggest that the
daddy quota in Quebec led to equalization of labor market opportunities of men and
women.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Quebec and Control Groups Be-
fore QPIP (2002 - 2005)
Quebec Control Difference
Labor force 0.636 0.652 0.016***
Employed 0.581 0.604 0.024***
High school or less 0.462 0.474 0.012***
Some college 0.081 0.090 0.010***
Post-secondary diploma 0.327 0.292 -0.035***
Bachelors degree 0.094 0.098 0.004***
Graduate degree 0.037 0.046 0.009***
Women 0.514 0.518 0.003***
Married 0.610 0.613 0.004***
Child 0.321 0.325 0.004***
17-19 0.048 0.052 0.004***
20-21 0.031 0.032 0.000**
22-24 0.045 0.044 -0.002***
25-26 0.030 0.028 -0.002***
27-29 0.043 0.042 -0.000
30-34 0.073 0.078 0.005***
25-26 0.088 0.090 0.002***
40-44 0.106 0.105 -0.000
45-49 0.106 0.102 -0.005***
50-59 0.094 0.089 -0.004***
55-59 0.082 0.076 -0.006***
60-64 0.064 0.058 -0.007***
65-69 0.050 0.049 -0.001***
70 & above 0.108 0.120 0.012***
N 873,600 3,947,754
Note: Statistics comparing Quebec and control provinces’ characteristics for the
pre-treatment period: 2002-2005.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: QPIP Effect on the Probability of Employment: Yearly
Coefficient
Younger women Older women Younger men Older men
Quebec*2002 -0.0077 -0.0111 0.0191∗∗ 0.0048
(0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0084) (0.0082)
Quebec*2003 -0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0023 0.0071
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0089) (0.0067)
Quebec*2004 0.0001 0.0060 -0.0024 0.0092
(0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0077)
Quebec*2006 -0.0011 -0.0042 0.0064∗∗ -0.0111∗
(0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0062)
Quebec2007 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0030 -0.0077
(0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0080) (0.0067)
Quebec2008 0.0039 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0083 -0.0164∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0056) (0.0080)
Quebec2009 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ -0.0001
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0077)
Quebec2010 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0106
(0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0084)
N 2122089 1328309 2286983 1242603
R2 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.13
All covariates YES YES YES YES
Clustered std. e. YES YES YES YES
Note: Younger women/men sample consists of 17-49 year old women/men with no or
young children (youngest child below 5 years), who were part of the Labor Force Survey
between 2002 and 2010. Older women/men sample consist of 50-64 years old women/men
with no or older children (youngest child at least 13 years old), who were part of the
Labor Force Survey between 2002 and 2010.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include covariates: education, age,
marital status and age of the youngest child. Specifications (2) and (4) include province
and state fixed effects. Standard error in specifications are clustered at province-year level.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.4: QPIP effect on the log hourly wage by group
Younger women Older women Younger men Older men
Quebec*After -0.0241∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗ -0.0273∗∗∗ -0.0113
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0095)
Mean Dep. Var. 2.72 2.88 2.86 3.11
N 1394728 631752 1543681 612689
R2 0.42 0.24 0.40 0.17
Province&year FE YES YES YES YES
All covariates YES YES YES YES
Clustered std. e. YES YES YES YES
Note: Younger women/men sample consists of 17-49 year old women/men with no or
young children (youngest child below 5 years), who were part of the Labor Force Survey
between 2002 and 2010. Older women/men sample consist of 50-64 years old women/men
with no or older children (youngest child at least 13 years old), who were part of the
Labor Force Survey between 2002 and 2010.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All columns reflect specification (2), which includes
covariates - education, age, marital status and age of the youngest child, as well as
province and state fixed effects. Standard error in specifications are clustered at
province-year level.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.5: QPIP effect on the Probability of Employment: Bartik
Included
Younger women Older women Younger men Older men
Quebec*After 0.0168∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0086 -0.0119∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0046)
Bartik -0.2832∗ -0.3627∗∗∗ 0.0288 -0.4589∗∗
(0.1599) (0.1231) (0.1643) (0.1906)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.73 0.59 0.78 0.70
N 2122089 1328309 2286983 1242603
R2 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.13
Province&year FE YES YES YES YES
All covariates YES YES YES YES
Clustered std. e. YES YES YES YES
Note: Younger women/men sample consists of 17-49 year old women/men with no or
young children (youngest child below 5 years), who were part of the Labor Force Survey
between 2002 and 2010. Older women/men sample consist of 50-64 years old women/men
with no or older children (youngest child at least 13 years old), who were part of the
Labor Force Survey between 2002 and 2010 (analogical for men groups).
Standard errors are in parentheses. All columns reflect specification (2), which includes
covariates - education, age, marital status and age of the youngest child, as well as
province and state fixed effects. Standard error in specifications are clustered at
province-year level.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Figure 3.1: Likelihood of Employment by Year and Demographic
Group
Younger women Older women
Younger men Older men
Note: Younger women/men sample consists of 17-49 year old women/men with no or
young children (youngest child below 5 years), who were part of the Labor Force Survey
between 2002 and 2010. Older women/men sample consist of 50-64 years old women/men
with no or older children (youngest child at least 13 years old), who were part of the
Labor Force Survey between 2002 and 2010.
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Figure 3.2: The Effect of QPIP on the Probability of Employment:
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Note: This figure plots year-specific coefficients from the regression results in Table 3.3.
The year 2005 is omitted. Younger women/men sample consists of 17-49 year old
women/men with no or young children (youngest child below 5 years), who were part of
the Labor Force Survey between 2002 and 2010. Older women/men sample consist of
50-64 years old women/men with no or older children (youngest child at least 13 years
old), who were part of the Labor Force Survey between 2002 and 2010.
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